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Abstract: This essay argues for the
permissibility of teaching Buddhist
mindfulness meditation in a critical
thinking course. One might object that
Buddhist mindfulness meditation is
part of a religion, and religions are
thought to be dogmatic and uncritical,
and thus inappropriate for a critical
thinking course. However, I argue
that there is a pathway from the
importance of self-regulation for good
critical thinking to the permissibility
of including mindfulness meditation
in a critical thinking course. I offer
three arguments for the permissibility
of inclusion: the self-regulation
argument, the expansion by way of
cognitive science argument, and the
persistence through emotional volatility argument. I then defend mindfulness meditation as an appropriate
form of meditation to include in a
critical thinking course.

Résumé: Cet essai avance qu’il est
permissible d'enseigner la méditation
bouddhiste de pleine conscience dans
un cours de pensée critique. On
pourrait objecter que la méditation de
pleine conscience bouddhiste fait
partie d'une religion que l'on pense
être dogmatique et non critique.
Cependant, je soutiens qu'il existe un
chemin entre l'importance de l'autorégulation pour développer une bonne
pensée critique et la permission
d'inclure la méditation. Je propose
trois arguments en faveur de de
permettre cette inclusion: l'argument
d'autorégulation,
l'argument
d’expansion par le biais des sciences
cognitives et l’argument de la persistance à travers la volatilité émotionnelle. Je défends ensuite la méditation de pleine conscience comme
une forme appropriée de méditation à
inclure dans les cours de pensée
critique.
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1. Self-regulation as a path to the inclusion of meditation in
critical thinking
According to the expert consensus on critical thinking in the Delphi Report, commissioned by the American Philosophical Association in 1990, good critical thinking
includes both a skill dimension and a dispositional dimension. The
experts find [critical thinking] to include cognitive skills in (1) interpretation, (2) analysis, (3) evaluation, (4) inference, (5) explanation and (6) self-regulation. (APA 1990, p. 4, emphasis added).

Most, if not all, critical thinking teachers are familiar with (1)–(5)
and teach them as core components of their critical thinking courses. What about (6), self-regulation? The experts define it as follows:
Self-regulation [involves] self-consciously monitoring one’s cognitive activities, the elements used in those activities, and the results produced, particularly by applying skills in analysis and
evaluation to one’s own inferential judgments with a view toward
questioning, confirming, validating, or correcting either one’s
reasoning or one’s results. (APA 1990, p. 10, emphasis added)

Do critical thinking teachers and critical thinking texts actually
include self-regulation as a component? If one examines two of
the leading textbooks on logic and critical thinking, Patrick Hurley’s A Concise Introduction to Logic 12th edition and Lewis
Vaughn’s The Power of Critical Thinking 4th edition, they will not
find substantive discussion of techniques for self-regulation or
exercises on how to develop self-regulation. While some textbooks, such as Judith Boss’s Think 5th edition, do include a section
on reason and emotion, most critical thinking textbooks do not
include exercises or discussion of techniques for developing selfregulation or why it is important. Yet, as the APA report explicitly
points out, it is a core part of good critical thinking, and by extension, a good critical thinker should be able to self-regulate. Is the
gap in critical thinking education, evidenced by the gap in major
texts that are used for teaching, acceptable?
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I think not. We live in a world of increasing polarization, misinformation, hostility, conspiracy theories, and tone policing.1 As
America approaches the 2020 presidential election, emotions are
on fire in a country that is growing more and more fractured. One
need only look at the September 29, 2020 presidential debate
between Joe Biden and Donald Trump in which a large number of
character assassinations and heated exchanges occurred to see how
volatile things are. Our current political environment cries out for
individuals engaged in political argumentation to exercise more
self-regulation. Why? Because political argumentation requires (i)
listening empathically to each other and (ii) responding in a relevant way to each other’s questions, arguments, and positions.
Meaningful political argumentation, with the final end of deciding
what is the way forward for everyone in a political body, requires
empathically listening to what everyone is saying and responding
in a relevant way with honesty, authenticity, and sincerity. Selfregulation is one of the elements of good critical thinking that
facilitates being able to accomplish (i) and (ii) in emotionally
volatile situations that require a commitment to quality reasoning
and self-correction throughout the dialogue.
The expert definition in the Delphi Report does not make explicit the relation between emotion regulation and self-regulation.
This might be because it assumes a tight distinction between cognitive processes and affective processes. According to the view I
advocate, there is interpenetration between cognitive and affective
processes on a gradient. In addition, emotion regulation is part of
self-regulation. In actual debates and discussions, we need emotion regulation in our self-regulation as we aim to empathically
listen to each other and react in relevant ways to the arguments
being made. There is no significant cognitive/emotional divide that
makes critical thinking only about self-regulation in a purely
cognitive way; self-regulation in critical thinking must cross over
to emotion regulation as well. The purpose of this paper is to begin
a discussion about the following question within the critical thinking and informal logic community: amidst the massive amount of
1

See Aikin and Talisse (2020) for an excellent discussion of political argument
in a polarized world.
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material that we already teach in critical thinking, is it permissible
to teach Buddhist mindfulness meditation in a critical thinking
course? You might ask: why Buddhist mindfulness meditation?
Well, why not mindfulness? Consider the self-regulation argument:
1. Mindfulness meditation improves emotion regulation,
which is an important part of self-regulation. It has the
capacity to improve self-regulation, at least by improving
emotion regulation, if not also by improving attention that
is directly relevant to self-regulation.
2. Self-regulation is central for critical thinking, as noted by
the Delphi Report.

3. Mindfulness meditation is a pathway to improving critical
thinking.
Importantly, the point here is only that mindfulness is one way to
improve self-regulation by acting on emotion regulation, not the
only way. Admittedly, the argument from self-regulation might not
convince everyone.
Thus, in section 2, I examine work by Mark Battersby and
Jeffery Maynes. My goal here is to show that the dialectic between
them also leads to an argument for the exploration of meditative
practices in critical thinking education: the expansion by way of
cognitive science argument. In section 3, I examine work by Harvey Siegel and Sharon Bailin. My goal here is to show that the
dialectic between them offers yet another pathway for bringing
meditative practices into critical thinking education: the persistence through emotional volatility argument. In section 4, because
there are so many meditative practices, I present criteria for selecting a form of meditation that can be taught in a critical thinking
course. I argue that mindfulness meditation deriving from the
Buddhist tradition satisfies the relevant criteria, although it is not
the only one. I then present research from contemporary cognitive
science and psychology about the emotional benefits of mindfulness, especially with respect to emotion regulation. Recognizing
that skepticism is a virtue, in section 5, I consider a recent study by
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Noone and Hogan that suggests that there is no traceable improvement in a person’s ability to think critically that is due to
mindfulness. I argue that while the study is important, there are
substantial reasons for thinking that further studies should be done,
as the authors themselves concede. I suggest a specific kind of
study that focuses on the ability to recover from defeat so as to
persist in critical thinking while holding to the standard of engaging in quality reasoning throughout an exchange. In section 6, I
move on to the issue of how meditation can be useful for improving performance in critical thinking by reducing the disruptive
effects of stereotype threat. My focus here is on presenting the
hypothesis that stereotype threat disrupts performance in critical
thinking and that negative impacts from stereotype threat can be
reduced by mindfulness. Finally, in section 7, I summarize my
argument for why it is permissible to include Buddhist mindfulness in a critical thinking course. I close by discussing three important objections: the location, demarcation, and propriety objections—the last of which motivates some to exclude mindfulness
because it is part of a religion.
2. Does the expansion of critical thinking lead to the inclusion
of meditation?
I am not alone in thinking that critical thinking education needs
expansion. One important argument for expanding critical thinking
education is offered by Mark Battersby (2016, pp. 118–120). His
position is highly attractive, given the world we now live in. He
claims that those involved in critical thinking education should
adopt the Critical Thinking Project (CTP), which involves improving reasoning through five areas of engagement. His five areas are
the following:
i.

ii.

Expanding the concept of critical thinking to include
evaluative rationality and rational decision-making in its
most inclusive sense.
Developing an alternative model of rational decision
making with usable guidelines for a rational decisionmaking process.

© Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Informal Logic, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020), pp. 545–586

550 Vaidya

iii.

iv.

v.

Making critical use of research coming out of cognitive
psychology and behavioral economics to help identify
tendencies in human judgment that can lead to irrationality.
Developing interdisciplinary research projects with researchers that are concerned with the application of reason to judgment and decision-making—in particular cognitive psychologists, behavioral economists, and applied
decision theorists in business faculties.
Teaching for evaluative rationality and rational decision
making as well as argument evaluation, reasonable discourse, and reasoned judgment.

The core idea of Battersby’s position is that critical thinking
education should be expanded from argument evaluation to decision making. Historically, most work in critical thinking focuses
on argument evaluation, such as through the identification of
informal or formally fallacious patterns of reasoning, or checking
the soundness and validity of an argument. Battersby’s argument
for expansion involves heavy reflection and engagement with
work in cognitive science and behavioral economics, particularly
work on heuristics and biases. His main argument is as follows:
1. Cognitive science and behavioral economics, especially
work on heuristics and biases as summarized in Daniel
Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow, shows that
the mind is prone to making certain kinds of errors in reasoning to a judgment both individually and collectively.
2. Critical thinking education should be informed by cognitive science and behavioral economics for the purposes of
being an adequate discipline that contributes to improving
the human condition through teaching “critical thinking.”
3. Including decision-making alongside argument evaluation
would make critical thinking education a better educational package and more relevant to the current human
condition than focusing only on argument evaluation.

4. We ought to adopt the Critical Thinking Project.
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However, there are challenges to CTP that derive from how one
looks at the relationship between research on human judgment and
the possibility of critical thinking. I will call the challenge to CTP,
deriving from research on human judgment and cognitive biases,
the cognitive bias challenge (CBC). Maynes (2015) has presented
a version of this challenge. Here I offer a similar version of the
challenge:
1. The CTP is useful only if it is portable and durable. That
is, if it has the capacity to be used successfully in a sustained way outside of the classroom.
2. Research on cognitive biases suggests that we suffer from
a number of cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus, and hindsight bias, which impede
the exercise of critical thinking.
3. If there is no solution to the barrier that cognitive biases
put up for the exercise of critical thinking, especially outside of the classroom, then the CTP is hopeless.
4. There is no solution to the problem posed by cognitive
biases.

5. The CTP is hopeless.
There are two points to take note of. First, (4) is not inconsistent with the argument for CTP, since CTP could still be a better
educational package than a non-CTP package, whether or not there
is a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Second, and fortunately for those engaged in critical thinking education and attracted to CTP, premise (4) is false. Maynes himself offers an intriguing solution. I will refer to his general solution strategy as the
Repertoire Response (RR). The core idea of RR is to concede that
we cannot debias those that we teach critical thinking to, but to
argue that we can provide students with a repertoire of strategies
that enable them to exert some degree of control over their biases.
The question of how much control is a controversial and still open.
Nevertheless, Maynes offers a view on what should be part of RR
(2015, p. 186). His view should be seriously considered. As he
says:
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Critical thinking essentially involves metacognitive skill, and critical thinking pedagogy should include a focus on developing this
skill […]. Typically, when teaching critical thinking, we teach
cognitive skills, such as argument diagramming or mapping, implicit premise identification, and fallacy identification. The metacognitive skills involved in critical thinking are those skills involved in recognizing when these cognitive skills should be used,
knowing how to use them, and why to use them.

Importantly, RR actually fits with the initial component of the
Delphi Report’s definition of ‘self-regulation’. Namely, the component dealing with self-consciously monitoring one’s reasoning
processes. Furthermore, and crucially, the self-regulation argument for including meditation within the context of critical thinking is additionally supported by the engagement with cognitive
science that Battersby and Maynes use in their support for CTP,
CBC, and RR. That is, there is an argument for including mindfulness in critical thinking education that comes from considering the
expansion of critical thinking through cognitive science. I call this
argument for including mindfulness in critical thinking courses:
the expansion by way of cognitive science argument.
Battersby’s and Maynes’ arguments rest on the claim that cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, or the mind sciences
in general, offer us important data for constructing an adequate
educational package for critical thinking. While Battersby looks to
cognitive science for potential new sources of what to teach,
Maynes looks to cognitive science for potential strategies to help
mitigate problems we might face when we exercise our critical
thinking skills. Fortunately, if we look into the literature in the
sciences, we will see that psychological research on meditation
shows that it can play an extremely important role in improving
self-regulation by improving attention, awareness, emotion regulation, cognitive control, and mental stability. I will discuss this
literature in more detail in sections 4 and 5. These skills facilitate
exercises of critical thinking. Arguably, someone who is good with
these skills will be better at critical thinking in high-stakes contexts. Therefore, and to the point, looking to the mind-sciences for
how to improve critical thinking education leads directly to inves-
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tigating meditation as a potential source for improving critical
thinking.
Coming from another direction, there is something else we need
to take into consideration when we think about expanding critical
thinking education. We should look at critical thinking as a globally informed project, rather than one that derives solely from Western sources on critical thinking. To look at critical thinking only
from a Western lens is, simply, uncritical and involves willful
persistence in not exiting one’s echo chamber on critical thinking.
Unfortunately, though completely excusable, Battersby offers his
expansion of critical thinking and Maynes offers his list of strategies for improving exercises of critical thinking by looking primarily at the development of critical thinking from within Western
philosophy and contemporary cognitive science.2 Furthermore, the
Delphi Report offers an account of critical thinking that neither
explicitly engages any expertise from outside of the Western
tradition, nor consults in depth with scholars working in traditions
outside of the West on dialectic and debate when generating a
conception of critical thinking skills, and the relation between the
cognitive and affective dimensions of critical thinking. So, even if
the definition of critical thinking is acceptable to all, it appears to
have not been generated in the right way. At best, it is a case of an
accidentally true belief. One could even argue that the expert
consensus is not taken from a panel of representative experts
across all relevant fields. The core group of experts is not sufficiently diverse.
Moreover, with an attitude of intellectual curiosity, we ought to
wonder what would an expanded critical thinking project and
repertoire of skills for improving meta-cognition look like if we
included ideas from a more globally informed conception of critical thinking? Looking only at Western sources leaves out the large
repository of critical thinking activities that are present in African,
Arabic, Native American, Buddhist, Chinese, Hindu, or Jain philosophy. More importantly, some traditions of philosophy embrace
both meditation and critical thinking. This leaves us with the
2

It is noteworthy that Maynes takes note of meditation as an approach but does
not discuss it in detail. See (2015, p. 189). He takes note of work done on
contemplative practices in higher education done by Barbezat and Bush (2013).
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question: why and on what grounds should we leave these traditions out of the discussion of what a new and expanded model of
critical thinking is? My hope here is to make the case for the view
that it is permissible to include meditation in a critical thinking
course. In making the case for the view that it is permissible to
include it, I am not legislating that everyone ought to teach it or
that it is the only thing worth adding for the purposes of improving
self-regulation in a critical thinking course. More importantly, I
am advocating for a complete overhaul of critical thinking education based on a cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary investigation
of critical thinking.
3. Unlocking a misconception about critical thinking as a
pathway to making room for meditation
Perhaps the expansion by way of cognitive science argument is no
more convincing than the self-regulation argument. As a consequence, I want to turn to an important critique of critical thinking
education presented by Sharon Bailin et al. (1999). This leads to
what I call the persistence through emotional volatility argument.
We can get a fix on the significance of her critique and its
relevance to the argument for including meditation by turning to a
core debate in the theory of critical thinking that is presented by
Harvey Siegel in his (1993) Not By Skill Alone: The Centrality of
Character to Critical Thinking. In this piece, Siegel contrasts two
views of critical thinking: the skill view and the character view.
He goes on to defend the character view.
The Skill View holds that critical thinking is exhausted by the
acquisition and proper deployment of critical thinking skills.
The Character View holds that critical thinking involves the
acquisition and proper deployment of specific skills as well
as the acquisition of specific character traits, dispositions,
attitudes, and habits of mind. These components are aspects
of the “critical spirit.”
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Bailin et al. (1999) argue that the notion of skill deployed both
in the skill view and the character view is highly problematic,
since it is tied to the tri-fold distinction across the concepts of
knowledge, skill, and attitude, where educators seek to place critical thinking in the skill category. There are two sides to this problem.
On the one hand, when critical thinking is thought of as a domain-general skill separated from domain-specific knowledge, it is
conceptualized as something that can be applied across domains
without any knowledge of the domain. Consequently, one can
come to see critical thinking as a domain-general skill that can be
properly deployed in a specific domain even by a person who does
not know anything about the domain. In my view, one pedagogical
problem that arises from this approach is that students might become overconfident with respect to using domain-general critical
thinking skills when they do not know anything about the domain
in question. This can lead to the raising of objections that are
logically relevant but misguided with respect to the history and
development of the specific domain. For example, one might
criticize an economic argument based on form alone without
understanding the historical context from which it derives and the
spirt of the author making the argument at the time it was made.
On the other hand, when critical thinking is thought of as a skill
that has been cut away from attitudes, it appears as if the disposition to engage in critical thinking is separated from the attitude
required for deploying it. For example, possession of the disposition to think critically, while not being motivated to do so by a
desire to have improved quality in reasoning, is problematic. It is
problematic when the disposition leads one to disrupt shared
communal reasoning in a way that derails it from its goal: deciding
on something important within a certain amount of time.
Thus, if the very notion of skill, where some theorists want to
place critical thinking, is problematic, then perhaps we ought to
abandon it. As a consequence, Bailin et al.’s argument provides us
with another reason to look for or generate a theory of critical
thinking that comes from global sources, for their argument has
been developed in reaction to the history of Western discussions of
critical thinking. In a globally sensitive survey of critical thinking,
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we will find that critical thinking is not always thought of as a skill
divorced from specific domains of knowledge in the way that
Bailin et al. find problematic.3 In addition, we will also come to
see that critical thinking is a domain of knowledge itself that is
substantive and value laden in a way that can be criticized by
looking at it cross-culturally (more on this point in section 7).
Bailin et al. (1999) also point out that there is a problem with
the way in which “skills” talk gets integrated into critical thinking
education. When one thinks of critical thinking as a skill, cut off
from knowledge and attitudes, pedagogy often aims towards practice and a certain kind of repetition of the skill as a way to the
proper acquisition of it. In the view that Bailin et al. advocate,
mere repetition of the pattern recognition aspect of the fallacy of
ad hominem or the form modus ponens will not work in the way
that it can work for the skill of dribbling a ball since the latter
simply involves gaining muscle memory and coordination, while
the former requires more.
[W]hat characterizes thinking which is critical is the quality of the
reasoning. Thus, in order to become a critical thinker, one must
understand what constitutes quality reasoning, and have the commitments relevant to employing and seeking quality reasoning.
(Bailin et al. 1999, p. 281, emphasis added)

The worry can be put more formally in the following way:
1. Skills in critical thinking cannot be separated from understanding the nature and the purpose of the task one is attempting to accomplish.
2. Skills in athletics can be separated from understanding
the nature and the purpose of the task one is attempting to
accomplish.
3. If two types of skills are sufficiently different in their nature, then the pedagogy appropriate to one is not appropriate to the other.
See Vaidya (2016) for discussion of the Nyāya tradition of classical Indian
philosophy where the relation between logic, epistemology, and debate is
conceived of in a different way.
3
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4. Talk of skills in critical thinking and skills in athletics are
sufficiently different.

5. The pedagogy appropriate to teaching athletic skills is not
appropriate for teaching critical thinking skills.
What Bailin et al. point to is the fact that attitudes about critical
thinking and knowledge of critical thinking concepts are key to
becoming a better critical thinker. It is not just possessing the skill.
It is not just having the disposition to deploy the skill in the relevant context. It also involves having the attitude of being committed to employing and seeking quality reasoning for the purpose at
hand.
Given the additional requirement of having the correct attitude
when engaging in critical thinking, there is now another reason
why it is permissible to teach meditation in a critical thinking
course: the ability to self-regulate is often necessary for seeking
and holding to quality reasoning in high-stakes contexts because of
the need to persist through emotional volatility. The importance of
this cannot be highlighted enough. It is when we cannot selfregulate in high-stakes contexts that we are likely to do our worst
with respect to critical thinking. The fact that the Delphi Report
holds that good critical thinking requires self-regulation is not
accidental or inessential. Self-regulation, via emotion regulation, is
a necessary condition for persisting through a volatile disagreement when one wants to sustain quality reasoning all the way
through to the final end where a decision is made. Thus, if Bailin
et al. are correct about critical reasoning involving a commitment
to quality reasoning over and above mere practice, it would be
ineffective to not include methods that facilitate holding to the
standard of quality reasoning through emotional volatility in critical thinking education.
In fact, Bailin et al.’s argument requires that we explore and
teach what would allow us to hold on to the standard of quality
reasoning through emotional volatility. Simply put, if x is a sufficient condition for performing y properly, or for improving one’s
ability to perform y, then all else being equal, if we think it is
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important to teach y, we ought to teach x also as a means to teaching y correctly. Thus, one can argue as follows:
1. Mindfulness meditation improves emotion regulation, a
subset of self-regulation, which is a key component of being a good critical thinker.
2. All else being equal, better emotion regulation will facilitate persisting through emotional volatility when critically
thinking in a high-stakes context.
3. Persisting through emotional volatility while critically
thinking in a high-stakes context facilitates holding to the
standard of quality reasoning until the end when a decision or evaluation of the discussion is made.
4. Arguably, there are no negative effects that derive from
teaching mindfulness meditation with respect to improving emotion-regulation.4
5. If it is permissible to teach x and y promotes the teaching
of x, then, all else being equal, it is permissible to teach y
as well.

6. It is permissible to teach mindfulness meditation as a tool
in a critical thinking course.
4. What is meditation?
‘Meditation’ is not easy to define. The main reason for the difficulty is that there are too many uses of the term, some of which are
broad, while others are narrow.5 For example, some uses of ‘meditation’ will include dancing and chanting as a form of meditation.
Others will hold that ‘meditation’ only refers to practices that
4

See Doran (2018), Purser (2019), and Seigel (2019) for discussion of one way
in which meditation can be thought of as being negative for a person. Take note
of the fact that these arguments do not speak directly to the issue of how meditation can be bad for critical thinking, but rather about why certain political
groups, such as neo-liberals, advance meditation. While I find Doran, Purser,
and Seigel to be making a highly relevant critical point that ought to be considered in full detail when thinking about the role of meditation in critical thinking,
their arguments are not decisively against it.
5
See (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson 2007, pg. 500–505)

© Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Informal Logic, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020), pp. 545–586

Is it Permissible to Teach Buddhist Mindfulness Meditation 559

involve sitting and focusing on one’s breath. I will not offer a
general account of meditation. For the purposes of my argument
for the permissibility of teaching meditation in a critical thinking
course, it will be central to work with a notion of ‘meditation’ that
has the following properties: (a) it comes from a tradition of
thought in which argumentation and the evaluation of argumentation is also found; (b) the notion of meditation that is at work is
researched in cognitive neuroscience; (c) some of the techniques
of meditation taught in the tradition can actually be taught in a
critical thinking course within the typical amount of time for
which those courses last, which is 10–16 weeks, and (d) the training is relatively easy to administer. Why these criteria?
First, my contention is that meditation can be taught in a critical
thinking course because meditation is found in traditions that
discuss critical thinking as part of what it is to be a critical thinker.
In particular, the philosophical and religious traditions of India,
such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, all develop views
about argumentation while also advancing some meditative practice as part of their philosophical outlook. Second, the notion of
meditation that I defend does have a substantial body of cognitive
neuroscientific research on it. According to Battersby and Maynes,
the reason for taking seriously decision-making and metacognitive
skills in critical thinking is that we learn a lot about how the mind
can go wrong and could be improved by paying attention to cognitive neuroscience, behavioral economics, and psychology. Thus, if
paying attention to those same areas were to point to something
that improves the mind with respect to decision making and metacognitive skill, a case could be made for including it in a critical
thinking course. Third, it would seem that inclusion of a practice
in a critical thinking course could only really happen if the technique can be taught with little, yet proper, training. Note that I did
not say with little practice of the right kind. Students spend a lot of
time learning how to argue for the presence of a fallacy; they
spend far less time learning what a fallacy is. Likewise, students
should not be spending an inordinate amount of time on what
meditation is. Rather, they should be engaging in a meditative
practice for a sustained amount of time (more on this in section 5).
These criteria are put in place for delimiting a serviceable notion
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of meditation for inclusion in critical thinking. As a consequence
of (a)–(d), I will focus my discussion of meditation on mindfulness, especially as it is found in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, and
contemporary versions of it, which derive from these traditions.
Mindfulness meditation satisfies (a)–(d), even if it is not the only
thing that does. The following are the reasons.
First, one finds work on critical thinking and argumentation in
the Buddhist tradition. Daniel Perdue’s (2014) A Course in Buddhist Reasoning and Debate is an outstanding presentation of the
analytical components of Indian and Tibetan approaches to argumentation and critical thinking. Second, mindfulness is one form
of meditation for which one finds a large repository of neuroscientific research.6 Kirk Warren et al.’s (2015) Handbook of Mindfulness: Theory, Research, and Practice presents an excellent overview of the extent of research in cognitive neuroscience on the
benefits of mindfulness. They survey a vast body of literature that
demonstrates the cognitive and neuroscientific basis for claims
about the benefits of mindfulness. Third, Jon Kabat-Zinn has put
40 years of applied research and development into his eight-week
Mindfulness-Based-Stress-Reduction (MBSR) program, discussed
in his (2013) Full Living Catastrophe: Revised Edition. In his
(2012) Mindfulness for Beginners, he shows that mindfulness is a
method that can be taught easily and practiced easily while yielding positive benefits.
To understand mindfulness, it will be useful to begin with a
distinction. The distinction is between focused-attention and openpresence/awareness styles of meditation. Focused attention meditation refers to a practice in which the mind is focused unwaveringly and clearly on a single object. The primary goal of focusedattention meditation is to develop the ability to focus on a single
object for an unlimited amount of time with unwavering attention.
Typically, there are two types of flaws that one can encounter
when engaging in focused attention. Either one falls victim to
dullness or to excitement. In the former case, an object of focus
may become blurry. In the latter case, one may become distracted.
6

See Guendelman et. al. (2017); Finkelstein-fox et. al. (2018) Huang et. al
(2019) for some recent studies on mindfulness and emotion regulation. However, Brown et. al is a good source.
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Developing focused attention requires cultivating the ability to
stay focused regardless of the pitfalls of dullness and excitement.7
Open presence meditation does not aim to produce a single mental
state. Rather, in open-presence, one comes to be aware of the
awareness and clarity that makes all cognitions possible. In meditative practices that involve open presence, practitioners seek to
develop the ability to observe without exercising judgment, to
develop awareness, and to develop clarity itself as objects and
attributes arise and fall away.8
4.1 The benefits of mindfulness meditation for critical thinking
Regardless of how one articulates what critical thinking is, it
would seem that critical thinking, as part of a commitment to
quality reasoning leading to a collective decision, involves solving
two problems.
The sorting problem for critical thinking is the problem of
determining, in a given context, which factors are relevant for
evaluating a claim or an argument or determining the matrix of
possible options. The suppression problem for critical thinking
involves suppressing or being in a position to judge, with good
evidence, that irrelevant factors have not influenced one’s evaluation, judgment, or decision. Both problems can be better understood by drawing a distinction between two contexts in which they
can arise.
The practice context is the familiar situation in which a person
learns and practices critical thinking skills. It is often a low-stakes
context. No substantial good is tied to the exercise of the skill,
other than a grade. The primary purpose of the practice is to improve or acquire the skill. The performance context is the familiar
situation in which a person is exercising critical thinking for the
purpose of making an argument or a decision. It is a context where
a substantial good is tied to the performance of the skill. The
performance context is, generally, a high-stakes context; it often
involves judgment and evaluation by others. For example, a presidential debate is a performance context. The portability of critical
7
8

(Lutze, Dunne, and Davidson: 511-513)
(Lutze, Dunne, and Davidson: 513-515)
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thinking skills refers to the ability to transfer exercises of critical
thinking from the practice context to the performance context. The
sorting and suppression problems arise in both contexts. But the
stakes are higher in the performance context. For example, when
things go wrong in a performance context surrounding an important decision, such as which policy on nuclear energy to adopt,
a wrong decision with drastic consequences can be made. To
understand how one could go about dealing with the suppression
problem, it is useful to distinguish between the sources from which
non-relevant factors can arise.
There are two main sources: cognitive and emotional. Cognitive sources include memory, attention, stored or occurrent beliefs,
as well as implicit biases. Emotional sources include specific
emotional states, such as anger, or mental states that are on the
boundary between moods and emotional states, such as boredom
or anxiety. By distinguishing these two sources, one can look to
see how mindfulness positively acts on each of these dimensions.
Because the focus of my argument for inclusion is primarily about
emotion regulation as part of self-regulation, I will be developing
the argument around the emotional benefits more than the argument around the cognitive benefits, although the latter also exist.
4.1.1 The emotional benefits
In Western philosophy and science, emotions are often differentiated first from moods, second by whether they are complex or
basic, and third by whether they are positive or negative. For
example, according to Ekman (1999), anger is a basic negative
emotion, while joy is a basic positive emotion.
What are the important properties of an emotion? According to
Gross (2008, p. 497–498), there are three important properties that
help define emotion. First, emotions are triggered by a situation
that pertains to the individual’s identity or goals. Second, emotions
are multifaceted embodied phenomena that involve subjective
experience, behavior, and peripheral physiology. Third, emotions
are malleable; they can force themselves upon our awareness, they
compete with other states for attention, but they do not automatically win out. Because emotions are malleable, it is possible for
them to be regulated. Gross further offers an account of emotion
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regulation where it refers to the regulation of emotions, rather than
how emotions themselves regulate a network of states and behaviors. In particular, emotion regulation has to do with how we try to
influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how
we experience and express these emotions.9 It is important to note
that emotion regulation can involve both down-regulation and upregulation (Gross 2008, p. 500):
i.

ii.

Down-regulation occurs when one regulates an emotion
or set of emotions down, such as when one wants to reduce the effect of the emotion.
Up-regulation occurs when one regulates an emotion or
set of emotions up, such as when they want to sustain the
effects of the emotion.

Direction
Down-Regulation

Valence
Positive: Hiding the fact Negative: Hiding your
that you feel good beanger at yourself because you won a tourcause you failed to
nament just before you
make a point during
shake hands with your
your match so that your
opponent.
opponent does not think
you are frustrated.

Up-Regulation

Positive: Sharing the fact
that you won the tournament with your family
to sustain the positive
feelings that come with
the emotion.

Negative: Sharing the
fact that you played
poorly with your coach
to transmit how you felt
about the match so as to
reflect on your emotional response.

9

It is important to take note of the fact that emotion regulation and emotion
generation are related to one another and that on some accounts of emotion,
emotion regulation amounts to emotion generation. Gross (2011) offers a
sustained discussion of the relation between scientific accounts of emotion and
the relationship between emotion regulation and emotion generation.
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Within the psychological literature on emotion regulation, it is
well known that negative emotions can lead to poor decisionmaking, unhelpful behavioral responses, and interpersonal conflict
(Arch and Landy 2015, p. 208). As a consequence, we might ask:
what are the emotional benefits that derive from mindfulness
meditation?
We can begin by distinguishing between state mindfulness,
induced or trait mindfulness, and trained mindfulness. State mindfulness refers to being in the state in which one is mindfully present. The mindful state might only occur for a brief period once a
day at a low intensity, or it might be more frequent and intense.
Induced or trait mindfulness refers to the tendency to reside in the
state of mindfulness. Trained mindfulness refers to the capacity to
cultivate and more frequently reside in a mindful state (Arch and
Landy 2015, p. 209). Given that our discussion here is focused on
the use of mindfulness within the context of critical thinking
courses, as noted earlier, it will be important to focus on studies of
mindfulness that could actually be used in class. In this category,
there are many studies of induced mindfulness that are short.
Short, or brief, induced mindfulness typically lasts 3–15
minutes in length. Inductions usually make use of guided instructions delivered via audio recordings or spoken instructions. These
small-dose mindfulness sessions can involve, and often do involve, naïve participants with no formal training. One might think
that such short sessions do not produce any positive effects. However, they do, even though it is better for one to engage in a longterm practice, which requires training for at least 8–10 weeks
(more on this in section 5). Some of the studied benefits of induced mindfulness (Arch and Landy 2015, p. 212) are:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Reduces negative affect.
Improves emotion regulation.
Promotes toleration and recovery from provocation.
Diminishes carryover effects from charged affective to
uncharged neutral stimuli.
v. Facilitates recovery from high-arousal states in a way
that blocks “contamination” of responses to neutral or
mixed material.
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vi. Reduces the threat value of aversive experiences.
According to Gross’s model of emotion regulation, mindfulness
is an attention deployment approach to emotion regulation. What
this means is that mindfulness trains the mind to regulate emotion
by acting on the generation of the emotion early on in the situation, which in turn affects emotion appraisals and responses downstream. An attention deployment strategy is contrasted with a
situation selection strategy or modification strategy. In the latter
approaches, a person aims to regulate emotions by either not engaging in situations that bring about the emotion or by modifying
the situation in some way to regulate the emotions. Neither of the
latter approaches are relevant to engaging in critical thinking in an
emotionally volatile performance context while trying to sustain
quality reasoning, since one has already placed themselves in the
relevant context. By contrast, in attention deployment, one focuses
on altering their attention in the situation, rather than avoiding or
changing the situation. The attention deployment approach is
central to sustaining quality reasoning in an emotionally volatile
performance context. Some of the ways in which mindfulness
improves emotion regulation via attention deployment (Arch and
Landy 2015, pp. 217–220) are:
i. Reduces negative appraisal of affective stimuli.
ii. Impacts emotional responses by dampening negative
affect and increasing greater positive affect in response to affective stimuli.
iii. Helps to regulate difficult emotions by providing direct contact with primary emotions that allows for
emotional exposure (i.e., deliberate, sustained, and
repeated contact with the full range of present emotional experience).
iv. Promotes adaptive regulation of emotional responses,
such as voluntary exposure to aversive stimuli and
self-threatening information, greater clarity about
what emotions are felt, acceptance of emotions experienced, and faster recovery from unpleasant emotions and aversive experiences.

© Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Informal Logic, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020), pp. 545–586

566 Vaidya

4.1.3 Emotion regulation and executive control
So, mindfulness positively affects emotion regulation, which is a
subset of self-regulation. But does the way in which mindfulness
helps with emotion regulation genuinely contribute to improving
the quality of one’s exercises of critical thinking? Recall, this is
the important point that derives from Bailin et al.’s (1999) discussion of why mere practice of the athletic kind in critical thinking
skills is misguided. To get better traction on our current question,
it is important to keep in mind two elements at play in the open
awareness component of mindfulness meditation: awareness and
acceptance. During the period of open awareness in mindfulness,
one focuses on gaining awareness of their mental states while at
the same time practicing non-judgment about what arises. How do
these two features help with emotion regulation?
There are at least two kinds of answers. In the response model,
mindfulness improves emotion regulation because it regulates our
emotional responses by reducing our emotional reactiveness. The
guiding idea is that we regulate better because we are not as emotionally reactive to the causes of our emotional states. The response model does little to motivate the idea that mindfulness can
improve critical thinking because it fails to suggest exactly how
being less reactive emotionally will better facilitate exercises of
critical thinking. However, things are different on the sensitivity
model.
According to this model, advanced by Teper, Segal, and
Inzlicht (2013), mindfulness meditation improves emotion regulation because it increases our sensitivity to subtle changes in our
affective states, which in turn signals the need for control and
energizes the execution of control (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The sensitivity model

In Teper et al.’s sensitivity model (2013, p. 4), mindfulness enhances cognitive control through its two facets: awareness and
acceptance. These facets work iteratively and interdependently to
facilitate executive control and thus emotion regulation. Boxes A
and B represent other hypothetical consequences of improved
executive control.
And, importantly, of course, the sensitivity model of emotion
regulation has a direct influence on self-regulation. Recall that the
Delphi Report holds that self-regulation involves both self-

© Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Informal Logic, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020), pp. 545–586

568 Vaidya

examination (the skill and willingness to engage in examining
one’s beliefs and processes for forming beliefs) and self-correction
(the skill and willingness to change one’s beliefs and processes for
forming beliefs in light of evidence of error and deficiency). That
is, the expert consensus holds that good critical thinkers should be
open to examining whether or not they are making errors and
devising strategies to deal with these errors when they detect them.
Furthermore, this need not only be done after the performance of
critical thinking is over, but also when it is actually going on, such
as during an emotionally volatile exchange. Importantly, Teper et
al. (2013) point out that mindfulness enables both the detection of
error and the willingness to improve one’s epistemic standing in
light of the detected errors or deficiencies.
Meditation experience presumably fosters an open acceptance of
one’s errors and the affective response to such errors, thereby facilitating control. That is, people who are able to accept the
“pang” of making an error may experience this quick affective
state more keenly and may thus be more likely to attend to their
errors and prevent them from happening on future trials. These
people may be better able to control their behaviors because they
are more accepting of their errors and associated conflict (Teper et
al. 2013, p. 3).

Note here that the core claim is about awareness and acceptance and not about absolute control. What is important is that
mindfulness can lead to more awareness and acceptance, which is
an intrinsic good for a critical thinker because it is partly constitutive of self-understanding. What has not been defended above is
that one who engages regularly in mindfulness will be able to
completely prevent irrelevant factors from contributing to their
exercises of critical thinking. There is no total solution to the
suppression problem. It would be a mistake to think, for example,
that greater awareness of implicit bias entails that one has complete control over the influence of implicit bias. Sometimes greater
awareness can backfire, such as when one believes that merely
being aware is sufficient for being able to make judgements that
are not contaminated by implicit bias. In such cases, this can end
up amplifying the effects of implicit bias on judgment.
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5. The scientific evidence against mindfulness in critical thinking education
The argument so far should lead one to the conclusion that exploring mindfulness in the context of critical thinking might have
emotional benefits related to specific goals of critical thinking
education, such as developing the skill of self-regulation. However, skepticism is a virtue. Thus, we should ask: is there evidence to
suggest that mindfulness mediation will not do anything? After all,
why hold that it is permissible to include it in a critical thinking
course if it cannot really help with anything?
Noone and Hogan (2018) engage this question directly in an
important study of the use of mindfulness meditation for critical
thinking education:
[Our 2018] study was designed to investigate the claim that mindfulness practice improves critical thinking. This claim was tested
by randomly allocating carefully screened volunteers to either a
mindfulness meditation program or a closely matched activecontrol condition for 6 weeks. Differences in performance, across
time and both groups, on an established critical thinking measure,
items from the literature on heuristics and biases, key thinking
dispositions and executive function were examined. It also tested
whether executive function mediates the relationship between
mindfulness and critical thinking in line with default interventionist theory and previous cross-sectional and experimental studies
which examined this relationship. Secondary analyses examined
the effects of mindfulness practice on wellbeing, affect and life
outcomes.
Our results show that, for most outcomes, there were significant changes from baseline to follow-up but none which can be
specifically attributed to the practice of mindfulness. (Noone and
Hogan 2018, p. 12, emphasis added)

The upshot is that although there were improvements in critical
thinking, none of those improvements were traceable to mindfulness meditation. Noone and Hogan’s (N&H’s hereafter) work
supports the skeptic’s position. But does it close the door to the
potential for mindfulness to improve critical thinking? They hold
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the following position with respect to the question of how beneficial mindfulness could be for critical thinking education:
While further research on [mindfulness mediation] is warranted,
claims regarding the benefits of mindfulness practice for critical
thinking should be tempered until evidence of these supposed benefits are presented (Noone and Hogan 2018, p. 15, emphasis added).

I agree and believe that more research should be done. More
importantly, more of the critical thinking and informal logic community should be engaged in it. The critical thinking community
needs a major study that is properly executed, evaluated, and
whose results are further debated. Here, I will argue that there are
substantial reasons for thinking that N&H’s study is clearly incomplete. My arguments point the way to a further study of mindfulness in relation to critical thinking education that focuses on the
ability to persist in critical thinking through emotional-volatility
based on the fact that mindfulness improves one’s ability to recover from public defeat.
First, when N&H draw their conclusion, we ought to worry
about how good the mindfulness intervention is. They say:
No evidence was found to suggest that engaging in guided mindfulness practice for 6 weeks, using the online intervention method
applied in this study, improves critical thinking performance.
(Noone and Hogan 2018, p. 15)

But an effective course in mindfulness, such as those developed by
Jon Kabat-Zinn in his Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, is
eight to ten weeks in length, perhaps with longer intervals and
different tasks than what was used in N&H’s study. Surely, we do
not expect students to learn how to identify fallacies better if we
do not give them the right kind or amount of homework necessary
to do so. Thus, while a six-week training in mindfulness meditation might start the process of training the mind, we might wonder
whether that time period is too short and whether those interventions are the best ones for improving critical thinking.
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Second, and more importantly, one ought to worry about the
level of motivation that the students have for mindfulness in an
online course, since (i) the whole course was conducted online, (ii)
online courses in general education have lower rates of participation than in-class face-to-face courses, and (iii) students often fail
to show any positive effect in normal critical thinking skills from
formative assessment to summative assessment across a two year
period.10 Moreover, suppose we were to test a population of subjects that were motivated to learn mindfulness for the purposes of
improving critical thinking so that they could better engage in
political argumentation in high-stakes contexts because they believe in the value of it for the following reasons: they (a) value
good political argumentation, (b) see the value of persisting in an
emotionally volatile conversation, and (c) want to see how mindfulness can help. Arguably, we should not think the same results
that N&H’s study found would show up. So, while N&H’s does
show that, in the limited time that mindfulness was used, there
were no benefits that were traceable to it, it does not follow that
mindfulness has no positive benefits for critical thinking in highstakes performance contexts when those that have studied mindfulness are committed to learning it for something they believe to
be valuable.
Third, and most importantly, the study focuses on the deployment of and execution of critical thinking on the basis of a disposition to engage in it for the purposes of the course. However, there
is another dimension to critical thinking that is also important. The
disposition to reengage in critical thinking with others, once one
has been shown to be defeated in front others. That is, the disposition to persist in critical thinking while holding to a high level of
quality when reasoning with others without resorting to, for example, name calling after one has been defeated in front of people
that are neither friends, family, nor people with whom one shares
political affiliation or a set of cultural beliefs. Simply put, it is the
ability to reengage and persist in a debate once one’s enemy has
shown them to be wrong. And reengaging with the desire simply
10

See Arum and Roska (2011) Academically Adrift for data and discussion of
this point relative to the first two years of college education where critical
thinking is taught across a range of courses.
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to hold to high quality reasoning to get at the truth without being
attached to one’s own view of the truth.
While N&H’s study provides evidence that supports the position that there is no improvement in critical thinking that is traceable to mindfulness, it could still hold that one is better situated to
reengage in critical thinking after an episode of defeat in an engagement because of mindfulness. The fundamental idea is that
critical thinking requires persistence through emotionally volatile
performance contexts. Defeat is commonplace enough that one
would more often benefit from critical thinking when committed
to quality reasoning were they to have the ability to recover from
defeat well enough to reengage in group critical thinking and
persist through emotional volatility to sustain quality reasoning. In
the close of the last section, I argued that Teper et al.’s work suggests that the positive benefits of mindfulness that feed emotion
regulation in the form of an attention deployment sensitivity model
would help one with the problem of recovering from defeat for the
purposes of persisting in critical thinking because mindfulness
improves awareness and acceptance. Thus, one area for further
study is along the dimension pertaining to persisting in critical
thinking through an emotionally volatile engagement where mutual defeat is common place amongst parties that disagree fundamentally.
6. Stereotype threat and mindfulness meditation
Putting aside the negative assessment of mindfulness presented in
N&H’s study, I now want to look at a study that shows how mindfulness positively improves performance with respect to a phenomenon that disrupts the quality of various kinds of performances. The phenomenon is stereotype threat. I will argue that if mindfulness can reduce the negative effects of race-based and genderbased stereotype threats on athletics and mathematics in performance contexts, then it can likely also reduce the negative effects
of social-category-based stereotype threats on critical thinking in
performance contexts. But first, what is stereotype threat? Steele
(2010, p. 5) presents an account of the pervasiveness of the phenomenon.
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I believe that stereotype threat is a standard predicament of life. It
springs from our human powers of intersubjectivity – the fact is as
members of society we have a pretty good idea of what other
members of our society think about lots of things, including our
major groups and identities in society. We could all take out a
piece of paper, write down the major stereotypes of these identities, and show a high degree of agreement in what we wrote. This
means that whenever we’re in a situation where a bad stereotype
about one of our identities could be applied to us – such as those
about being old, poor, rich, or female – we know it. We know
what “people could think.” We know that anything we do that fits
the stereotype could be taken as confirming it. And we know that,
for that reason, we could be judged and treated accordingly.
That’s why I think it is a standard human predicament.

Stereotype threat typically occurs when performance on a task
for a group, such as blacks or women, is decreased because a
stereotype that is thought to apply universally to members of the
group is activated. Two common stereotypes, whose threats have
been widely studied, are athletic ability and math ability.
Group
White Men
Women

Contrast
Group
Black Men
Men

Ability

Threat

Athletic Ability
Math Ability

Not as Good
Not as Good

Steele (2012, pp. 8–9) discusses the athletic ability stereotype
through the work of a group of Princeton University social psychologists working on performance. In one study, Jeff Stone and
company took white students and told them to play ten holes of
golf and that the test they were taking was designed to test their
“natural athletic ability.” White participants who were told this
performed worse than white participants who were not told this. In
a follow-up study, Stone and company took a group of black participants and put them through the same test with the prompt that
the test was designed to test their “natural athletic ability.” However, this time they found that there was no effect on the black
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participants’ golf performance. Stone describes the problem the
white participants faced:
If [the white participants] experienced the frustration at golf, then
they could be confirming, or be seen to be confirming, the unsavory stereotype. If [the white participants] didn’t experience frustration at golf, then they didn’t confirm the racial stereotype. This
was an extra pressure they had to deal with during the golfing
task, for no other reason than that they were white. It hung over
them as a threat in the air, implying that one false move could get
them judged and treated as a white kid with no natural athletic
ability. (Steele 2012, p. 9)

Awareness of stereotype threat is important for educators to
take into consideration, given that stereotype threat often causes a
decrease in performance that has nothing to do with the skill in
question. Importantly, when we look at the relationship between
stereotype threat and performance, we must pay attention to the
role of working memory in performance. According to one account, the very same resources necessary for task performance are
drained by stereotype threat. Good performance is correlated with
proper functioning of working memory. Stereotype threat drains
working memory, which thus takes away resources for optimum
performance. But by looking at the relationship between how
stereotype threat causes poor performance, we are also led to a
possible cure. Mindfulness acts on working memory. In fact, it
acts on both attention and working memory so as to improve them.
Thus, we should expect that when one has practiced mindfulness
for a sufficiently long period of time, one should be less susceptible to the disruptive effects of stereotype threat.
In their (2012) article, Weger et al. conducted a study in which
they showed that mindfulness reduces the disruptive effects of
stereotype threat. In the study, 71 female psychology students aged
18–37 were randomly assigned to either a 5-minute mindfulness
task or the control task. Some of the participants were then induced with stereotype threat (female = low math performance),
and everyone’s math performance was subsequently tested. The
mindfulness task was the “raisin task” that induces mindfulness of
the present moment by encouraging the meditator to drop into
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their awareness of the present moment. The participants in the
mindfulness condition scored much higher than those in the control. They maintain the following:
The central finding of our study – the fact that the impact of stereotype threat was reduced when participants engaged in a mindfulness task – is of particular interest in light of the significance of
this effect and because of the debilitating impact it has on various
parameters of performance. Of note is the fact that a 5 min mindfulness manipulation is sufficient to reduce the effect of stereotype
threat...(Wenger et al. 2012, p. 473, emphasis added)

If mindfulness meditation can reduce the negative effects of a
gender-based stereotype threat for math ability in a performance
context, can it also do it for critical thinking in a performance
context? Consider the transfer argument:
1. Mathematics and critical thinking are sufficiently similar.
2. If mindfulness meditation works to reduce stereotype
threat on math, based on a gender-stereotype, in a performance-context, and math is sufficiently similar to critical thinking, then mindfulness meditation should work to
reduce stereotype threat on critical thinking, based on social-category stereotype, in a performance context.

3. Mindfulness meditation should work to reduce stereotype
threat on critical thinking, based on a social-category, in a
performance context.
However, one could counter the transfer argument by holding that
the positive effects of mindfulness on math performance will not
carry over to critical thinking performance because the domains
are different in various ways. In response to this worry, I will take
note of two facts.
First, while it is true that in the case of math that mindfulness
worked directly on a gender-based stereotype related to math, and
there is arguably no similar stereotype concerning critical thinking,
one need not activate a stereotype threat directly about critical
thinking for mindfulness to payoff. One might just activate a near
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stereotype about central social categories a person identifies with,
such as age, religion, economic status, social status, or gender,
which disrupt one’s critical thinking in a performance context.
Political argumentation is often identity based in an obvious way:
political parties often exclude certain kinds of identities from
membership. So, in political argumentation, identity-based stereotypes are often at play.
For example, consider the claims made by Donald Trump
concerning Joe Biden’s cognitive abilities based on his age and
some of his speaking performances.11 Arguably, a stereotype
threat has been activated for Biden: old men are not good at making difficult decisions and engaging in critical thinking in a highstakes context. However, if mindfulness can reduce stereotype
threat in general, then the activation of this age-based stereotype
threat can be reduced, and quality critical thinking can remain
stable throughout a performance context in which it is active.
Second, math and critical thinking need not be sufficiently
similar with respect to content. Rather, they need to be similar
with respect to what components of the mind are used and tasked.
The fact that a person engaged in critical thinking would use (a)
working memory and would need to (b) regulate emotions due to
high-stakes and emotional volatility suffices for the positive benefits. Consider Wenger et al. on the relation amongst mindfulness,
working memory, and stereotype threat.
The experience of stereotype threat drains available working
memory resources […] while mindfulness restores depleted working memory resources. Mindfulness may therefore facilitate performance by countering the resource-dependent impact of stereotype threat. (Wenger et al. 2012, p. 474, emphasis added)

For example, see Trump’s mid-August campaign ad:
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-launches-ads-questioningbiden-mental-faculties.
11
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Thus, since critical thinking in performance contexts uses working
memory and requires emotion regulation, the positive benefits of
mindfulness should occur.
7. Final objections
Before moving on to objections to the permissibility to teach
Buddhist mindfulness meditation in a critical thinking course, let
me summarize the position presented. Recall the Delphi Report’s
definition of good critical thinking:
[G]ood critical thinking includes both a skill dimension and a dispositional dimension. The experts find [critical thinking] to include cognitive skills in (1) interpretation, (2) analysis, (3) evaluation, (4) inference, (5) explanation, and (6) self-regulation (APA
1990, p. 4, emphasis added).

In this essay, I have provided three arguments for why it is
permissible to include Buddhist mindfulness meditation in a critical thinking course: the self-regulation argument, the expansion by
way of cognitive science argument, and the persistence through
emotional volatility argument. In addition, I have argued that
Buddhist mindfulness meditation satisfies four criteria for the kind
of meditation that can be considered within the context of critical
thinking education. The criteria were: (a) the meditative practice
comes from a tradition of thought in which argumentation and the
evaluation of argumentation is also found; (b) the notion of meditation that is at work is researched in cognitive neuroscience; (c)
some of the techniques of meditation taught in the tradition can
actually be taught in a critical thinking course within the typical
amount of time for which those courses last, which is 10–16
weeks; and (d) the training is relatively easy to administer. In
addition, I argued that mindfulness meditation does have positive
benefits in the space of emotion regulation, a subset of selfregulation, and that these benefits minimally surround the area of
awareness and acceptance. I further argued that N&H’s study that
claims that the positive benefits of mindfulness for critical thinking should be tempered can be improved on in important ways. In
particular, with respect to the dimension concerning the disposi-

© Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Informal Logic, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020), pp. 545–586

578 Vaidya

tion to persist in critical thinking through emotional volatility in a
performance context when one has been defeated in front of others. Finally, I discussed how mindfulness has the ability to positively promote better exercises of critical thinking by reducing the
disruptive effects of stereotype threat in a performance-context.
But my argument for why we can include Buddhist mindfulness
meditation in critical thinking is incomplete until I respond to
three important objections to including it in critical thinking courses.
First, and foremost, is the location objection. Suppose one were
to agree that mindfulness can improve self-regulation, and further
suppose that one was inclined to want to do more research in order
to test out the benefits of mindfulness in an educational context.
Nevertheless, one might be skeptical about where it should be
taught. Are critical thinking courses the right place for mindfulness to be taught? There are good reasons for being skeptical. For
one, most universities already have a wellness center, so why
couldn’t mindfulness be taught as an option in courses offered by
the athletics department or the wellness center? Why should we
consider it as an option in a critical thinking course? Another
reason might be that there is so much that needs to be taught in a
critical thinking course that there seems to be no room to add more
without deleting other things that are vital to the course, such as
becoming familiar with cognitive biases and fallacious reasoning,
either of the formal or informal kind. Finally, the benefits of mindfulness seem to be useful for a wide variety of educational activities, from math to history, because in all of these cases focused
attention and self-awareness are valuable. So, why introduce it in
critical thinking?
The main reasons why mindfulness can be taught in a critical
thinking course are that (i) an expanded notion of “critical thinking,” such as what Battersby proposes, already provides a path to
including mindfulness in critical thinking courses, and (ii) mindfulness derives from a tradition that develops important contributions to argumentation theory as well.
Moreover, when Socrates noted that the unexamined life is not
worth living, he was not telling us to examine our relation to the
world around us and not think critically about ourselves through
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self-reflection and self-examination. Arguably, a nuanced and
global history of critical thinking would show that selfunderstanding through self-examination and self-reflection are
core elements of what it is to be a critical thinker. Within Buddhism, we find mindfulness as a tool for self-understanding, and in
so far as self-understanding feeds the project of critical thinking, it
seems completely relevant to teach it in a critical thinking course.
In addition, by allowing those working in critical thinking education to teach mindfulness meditation, or some kind of selfregulation tool, we are not precluding it from being offered by a
university wellness center. The goal here is to defend the permissibility of teaching Buddhist mindfulness meditation in a critical
thinking course. The goal is neither to show that Buddhist mindfulness is the only thing that can improve self-regulation nor to say
that critical thinking is the only place where it belongs. Phil Jackson, the famous LA Lakers coach, already pioneered the use of
Zazen meditation in training basketball players.12 Would it be so
much of a stretch to want to include mindfulness in critical thinking courses, which emanate from philosophy departments, especially given that Buddhism is a philosophical tradition that is often
excluded from the philosophical canon for no good reason?
Second, there is the demarcation objection. What has been
argued here is that mindfulness can yield benefits for critical
thinking education. But some would argue that many other things
will also, such as better sleep, less stress, proper diet, and good
exercise. Moreover, there are many things that would improve
critical thinking education, so why shouldn’t these be taught in
addition to mindfulness? What is the proper boundary of critical
thinking education?
This is an important objection because it asks us to think about
how to draw a new boundary around critical thinking. If Battersby
is correct in calling for an expansion of critical thinking that
moves away from, for example, fallacy identification and argument formalization and towards evaluative rationality and decision
making, then we need a new way to draw a boundary around
See Allhoff & Vaidya (2007) for discussion of Phil Jackson’s work in basketball.
12
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critical thinking. For even in Battersby’s CTP, one might ask: why
should decision making be taught in critical thinking; isn’t it the
topic of business management, economics, and decision science
courses? What is the new boundary? And why is any given boundary justified?
I have no new boundary to offer, but only signal that if the
science of decision making can make it into critical thinking, then
so should mindfulness, but the science of sleep should not. On the
view I hold, there are traditions of philosophy, such as Buddhism,
Hinduism, and Jainism, to name a few, where meditation plays an
important role in self-understanding. Importantly, these traditions
developed theories of good argumentation and debate. For example, Vaidya (2016) discusses the Nyāya tradition of classical Indian philosophy and the contribution it makes to debate and dialogue.
As argued here, mindfulness plays a role in the development of
a critical thinker. Arguably, mindfulness facilitates non-attachment
to winning a debate, given that it improves emotion regulation
through acceptance and awareness. Moreover, one who is searching for the truth through argumentation is less likely to be attached
to winning an argument if they engage in mindfulness. Moreover,
they would be in a position to admit defeat on a point and return to
arguing for the purposes of finding the truth. Finally, while it is
true that there are other things that facilitate good critical thinking,
the reason for excluding these things is obvious: there are places
for discussion of proper nutrition and stress reduction in our current education practice. Recall that the argument here is not that
mindfulness should only be taught in critical thinking courses;
rather, it is that mindfulness arguably facilitates good critical
thinking and is tied to a tradition that engages in both critical
thinking and meditation.
Third, there is the propriety objection. The worry here is powerful, and it should not be ignored. It is the central reason why I
am only arguing for the claim that it is permissible to teach mindfulness, as opposed to the claim that it is obligatory to teach it. The
worry comes from two directions. One the one hand, bringing
mindfulness into critical thinking education brings religion into a
context where it does not belong because other religions are not
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being represented. On the other hand, critical thinking education is
already biased, and the introduction of mindfulness would amplify
the bias.
Robert Ennis (1998) gives a sound articulation and hearing to
the second version of the propriety objection in his: Is Critical
Thinking Education Culturally Biased? The worry he is concerned
with is that the promotion of critical thinking is in tension with the
values or practices of certain cultures. He discusses the examples
of the Inuit that are not always open to requests for reasons and the
Amish that are not always critical of what they read. Applied to
the argument here, the worry is that adding mindfulness is a violation of the ethos of certain cultures that do not practice meditation
or value individual self-understanding and self-examination.
Furthermore, following the trajectory of the first version of the
critique, one might think that extracting mindfulness from Buddhism as a practice that ultimately aims at soteriological goals
such as the elimination of suffering is in tension with the deployment of it in the context of improving critical thinking. The idea is
that mindfulness is part of a religious practice, and it is only by
removing it from a religious context that one can argue that it is
not religious and can function properly in the context of critical
thinking. One might worry that the extraction involves cultural
appropriation that is inappropriate.13
My view is that all of these worries are important and require
further sustained discussion. However, there is a path forward for
ameliorating some of the pressure that the propriety objection
brings. First, there is the distinction that Ennis uses to show that
critical thinking is not biased. Second, there is the historical fact,
concerning the Buddhist tradition, where both critical thinking and
meditation are engaged.

13

One place to see in detail where the kind of worry I have in mind here is
discussed is in Evan Thompson’s (2020) Why I am not a Buddhist. In this work,
he takes on Buddhist Modernism in a detailed discussion and aims to show
where it is problematic. If one were to think that my own argument for the
inclusion of mindfulness in critical thinking is a kind of Buddhist Modernism,
then Thompson’s book would be a good place to see where modernism goes
wrong.
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On the one hand, Ennis distinguishes between promoting critical thinking as a disposition for engagement in shared decision
making and holding it as an ideal for reasonable decision making.
The core of the distinction is between promoting a practice and
legislating when and where the practice should be applied. The
overall flavor of Ennis’ distinction is correct. We need to promote
a certain kind of engagement, critical thinking, for the purposes of
cross-cultural cooperative decision making—especially with respect to enabling democratic processes in nations that have citizens whose allegiance is to a variety of different religions and
traditions. However, promotion is not the same as legislation. So,
in the case of mindfulness, we can teach it in a critical thinking
class with the aim of promoting it as a tool for self-understanding
and self-examination, which also facilitates ordinary skills of
critical thinking. And we can promote this without legislating that
anyone must do it. Ennis’ distinction is important because it captures how education works. We educate by providing opportunities
to learn and consider whether one wants to further deploy the skill
and knowledge they have learned. We do not require or legislate
that one must use all of what they learn. By merely bringing meditation into the critical thinking context, informing students of what
it can do, and providing them with adequate training, one has
sufficiently provided them with the opportunity to decide if they
want to continue to do it.
On the other hand, we should take note, again, of the fact that it
is not true that Buddhism is predominately concerned with meditation at the expense of analytic thinking and argumentation. As I
argued earlier, one of the advantages of drawing on mindfulness
from the Buddhist tradition is that we already find in the tradition
a rigorous engagement with more familiar forms of critical thinking involving argument analysis and the identification of fallacious
forms of reasoning. Moreover, if it is important to read Daniel
Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking Fast and Slow in developing an
expanded notion of critical thinking for the 21st century, one ought
to also consider Daniel Perdue’s (2014) A Course in Buddhist
Reasoning and Debate and John Kabat-Zinn’s (2013) Full Living
Catastrophe.
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In addition, it is important to recognize that the asymmetric
position that holds that critical thinking, informal logic, and formal
logic are value neutral but mindfulness meditation is value laden
is incorrect. Some might be inclined to think that critical thinking
is a value-neutral form of education that is valuable to all because
it does not import any substantive views about anything but only
offers tools that are domain general and useful across many different disciplines. By contrast, one might think that Buddhist mindfulness meditation is value-laden, and because of the asymmetry
between the two, and the commitment to the view that critical
thinking education involves open inquiry that is absent of dogma ,
one cannot include Buddhist mindfulness meditation in a critical
thinking course. However, this argument is challenged by the fact
that critical thinking, informal logic, and formal logic are value
laden. We debate theories of critical thinking, informal logic, and
logic because there are substantial values at play in those disciplines.14
Finally, and to clarify, the arguments here neither show (i) that
Buddhist mindfulness is necessary for becoming a good critical
thinker; rather, they only aim to show that there are good reasons
to think that further exploration of mindfulness in critical thinking
is warranted; nor (ii) that becoming more aware of one’s mental
states and being able to accept defeat and persist in an emotionally
volatile conversation will lead to complete control over implicit,
cognitive, or emotional biases, which we aim to suppress in good
exercises of critical thinking. Instead, they show that it is permissible to teach mindfulness for the purposes of improving emotion
regulation, which is a part of self-regulation and is central to being
a good critical thinker.
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